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Abstract
This article traces some of the North American theological influences on contempo-
rary Christian nationalism in Zambia. Beginning with an overview of key tenets of
Christian Reconstruction and theNewApostolic Reformation, I showhow thesemove-
ments have influenced the writing of some key players in Zambia’s Christian nation-
alist project. I also demonstrate how these authors have modified the Western ideas
that have shaped their thought. This analysis responds to calls in the anthropology of
Christianity for better documentation of the various forms Christian nationalism takes
around the world, perhaps especially outside the West. It also challenges easy argu-
ments about the influence of Western Christian activists on Christian politics in Africa
by foregrounding the agency of local writers and theologians, even as they engage with
theological ideas that originated in theWest.
Keywords
Christian nationalism – Zambia – political theology – transnationalism – Christian
Reconstruction – New Apostolic Reformation
These days, one does not have to look far to find critiques blaming Christian
activism in Africa onWestern religious influences. The most obvious example
is anti-lgbt legislation in several countries, which, many argue, is more reflec-
tive of Western concerns than of those of African Christians themselves. As
pastor and activist Kapya John Kaoma puts it, “Anti-gay legislation and con-
stitutional prohibitions are often drafted by Africans who are ‘ideologically
mentored’ and trained byU.S. conservatives, and the bills reflect American, not
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African realities.”1While there is no disputing the clear links betweenWestern,
particularly North American, conservative Christianity and these sorts of polit-
ical developments in Africa, we should be skeptical of arguments that suggest
that foreign ideas have been taken up whole cloth without being transformed
to reflect local concerns.2 Nor should we forget that the currents of theologi-
cal influence flow in more than one direction.3 Building on these observations
about how theological—and specifically political-theological—concepts cir-
culate and are transformed transnationally, I aim in this article towork through
the adoption of a fewWestern ideas that have figured in Christian nationalism
in contemporary Zambia. Specifically, I explore the influence of twoprominent
strains of what is sometimes called “dominionism,” twentieth-century Chris-
tian Reconstructionism, and the more recent New Apostolic Reformation. By
exploring the application of theseWestern theological traditions in an African
context, my analysis speaks to variations in the Christian political-theological
nexus in both parts of the world.
Let me begin by clarifying what I mean by “Christian nationalism.” With
this term I am referring to the broad but nevertheless explicit convergence
of visions of national identity or destiny with narratives of Christian elec-
tion or providence.4 In an important article about the variety of forms that
Christian nationalism takes, Jon Bialecki has highlighted “the unfixed nature
of the nationalist imagination”5 as key to understanding the differences among
Christian nationalist projects around the world. Toward this end, he demon-
strates how particular features of Christianity—eschatology, differentiation,
boundary-making—can, under particular circumstances, “crystalize” in a
Christian nationalism that, while always uniquely inflected by its social or cul-
tural context, nevertheless shares some commoncore characteristics. Themost
notable of these, in Bialecki’s analysis, is a kind of Nietzschean ressentiment
through which Christians come to think of themselves as both an entitled
majority and an embattled minority.6
1 Kapya John Kaoma, Colonizing African Values: How the U.S. Christian Right is Transforming
Sexual Politics in Africa (Somerville, MA: Political Research Associates, 2012), 9.
2 Joel Robbins, “The Globalization of Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity,”Annual Review
of Anthropology 33 (2004): 117–143, 118.
3 See for example, Jon Bialecki, “The Third Wave and the Third World,” Pneuma 37 (2015):177–
200.
4 Here my thought follows that of Stephen Backhouse. See Stephen Backhouse, Kierkegaard’s
Critique of Christian Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
5 Jon Bialecki, “Eschatology, Ethics, and Ēthnos: Ressentiment and Christian Nationalism in the
Anthropology of Christianity,”Religion and Society: Advances in Research 8 (2011):42–61, 42.
6 Bialecki, “Eschatology, Ethics, and Ēthnos,” 49–51.
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Bialecki’s argument turns on his research with North American charismatic
Evangelicals, but his broader aim is to “catalyze debate and encourage the kind
of fine-grained ethnographic discussions that can flesh out the contours of …
the Christian nationalist problem.”7 Following Bialecki’s lead, my aim in this
article is to do precisely that. Leaving aside for themoment the particular prob-
lem of applying Nietzschean concepts to a postcolonial African context, in the
discussion that follows I explore “the contours of … the Christian nationalist
problem” in contemporary Zambia by examining some of the historical, tran-
scultural influences that have shaped it into what it is today. The two key issues
that emerge from this analysis are, first, a unique understanding of the limita-
tions of the secular liberal state, and, second, the evolving relationshipbetween
Christian adherence and expectations for economic development. When it
comes to documenting the broad range of forms that Christian nationalism
takes, Zambia is especially good to think with. As the only self-declared Chris-
tian nation inAfrica, and as such themost fully realized expression of Christian
nationalism on the continent, Zambia has long served as a sort of “laboratory
for studying… a certain kind of evangelical politics in action.”8While the coun-
try is therefore something of a limit case, the view from its position of relative
extremity affords an important perspective on broader religious trends visible
across Africa and beyond.
Zambia was initially declared a Christian nation by pentecostal president
Fredrick Chiluba in 1991. Five years later “the declaration,” as it is often known,
was enshrined in the preamble to the Zambian constitution, where it remains
to this day.9 As I have demonstrated in greater detail elsewhere, the theolog-
ical underpinnings of the declaration were structured by pentecostal prac-
tice, particularly positive confession and the productive exchanges associated
with the prosperity gospel.10 Most Zambian Pentecostals regard the declara-
tion as a sacred covenant between God and their country, the key to future
prosperity and the guarantor of domestic peace. This emphasis on the declara-
tion as covenant, which I return to below, is fundamental to the way believers
understand the role of national leadership, particularly the responsibilities of
7 Bialecki, “Eschatology, Ethics, and Ēthnos,” 46.
8 Paul Freston, Evangelicals andPolitics inAsia, Africa and LatinAmerica, (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2004), 154.
9 For further discussions of the declaration see Paul Gifford, “Chiluba’s Christian Nation:
Christianity as a Factor in Zambian Politics 1991–1996,” Journal of Contemporary Religion
13 (1998): 363–381; Isabel Apawo Phiri, “President Frederick J.T. Chiluba of Zambia: The
Christian Nation and Democracy,” Journal of Religion in Africa 33 (2003): 401–428.
10 Naomi Haynes, “ ‘Zambia Shall be Saved!’ Prosperity Gospel Politics in a Self-Proclaimed
Christian Nation,”Nova Religio 19 (2015): 5–24.
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the president, which hinge on maintaining the covenant established by the
declaration.11 Chiluba’s vision of what it meant for Zambia to be a Christian
nation shaped a number of policy initiatives during his presidency, including
the establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel (like many of their counter-
parts elsewhere, Zambian Pentecostals are Zionists); the issue of diplomatic
passports to prominent pastors (who were to be “ambassadors” of the Chris-
tian nation); and large evangelistic crusades featuring international preachers,
presided over by the president and supported by state funds. In addition, the
Chiluba government relaxed the regulations for registering churches and secur-
ing land for church buildings, a move that disproportionately favored Pente-
costals.12
Both ideologically and practically, then, the declaration has been a largely
pentecostal concern. Meanwhile, Christians from other denominations have
been vocal in their criticisms of the declaration; in the case of Catholics, for
example, the argument is that a close alliance between Christianity and the
government hinders the capacity of the church to speak critically when con-
fronted with abuses of state power, such as Chiluba’s attempt to alter the con-
stitution so that he could run for an additional term as president, a move that
his pentecostal peers broadly supported.13 Studies of Christian nationalism in
Zambia like the one I offer here are therefore of particular interest to scholars
of Pentecostalism.
Before going any further, one brief observation about the terminology of this
article is in order. While common in journalistic discussions of North Ameri-
can Christianity, the term “dominionism” has been rejected by proponents of
the theology examined here as well as by scholars studying so-called “domin-
ionist” movements. AsMichael J. McVicar demonstrates in an excellent history
of the word,14 “dominionism” was a label coined by commentators, first Chris-
tian, then secular-liberal, who were trying to diagnose what they saw as a set
of worrisome theological developments alongside the rise of the Moral Major-
11 Naomi Haynes, “Why Can’t a Pastor be President of a Self-Proclaimed ‘Christian Nation’?:
Pentecostal Politics as Religious Mediation.” Political and Legal Anthropology Review 41
(2018): 60–74.
12 Elizabeth Sperber and Erin Hern, “Pentecostal Identity and Citizen Engagement in Sub-
Saharan Africa: New Evidence from Zambia,”Politics and Religion 11 (2018): 830–862.
13 Marja Hinfelaar, “Debating the Secular in Zambia: The Response of the Catholic Church
to Scientific Socialism and Christian Nation, 1976–2006,” in Christianity and Public Culture
in Africa, ed. Harri Englund (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011).
14 Michael J. McVicar, “Let ThemHaveDominion: DominionTheology and the Construction
of Religious Extremism in the US Media,” The Journal of Religion and Popular Culture 25
(2013): 120–145.
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ity in the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s. Today, McVicar argues, the term serves
primarily as “a screen on which critics project myriad competing interpreta-
tions of the proper place of religion in American society” rather than a precise
classification of a theological movement.15 He therefore suggests that scholars
avoid it. Following McVicar’s careful reading, I do not make much use of the
term “dominionism” here, preferring instead to use the emic labels “Christian
Reconstruction” and “New Apostolic Reformation” to refer to Western theolo-
gies and “Christian nationalism” or “Christian nationalist activists” in reference
to Zambia.
The argument of this article draws on my significant experience studying
Zambian Christianity, primarily in its pentecostal forms. Building on long-term
field research in independent pentecostal congregations on the Copperbelt
province,16 in 2017 I began a new research project focused on recent govern-
ment efforts to “actualize” the declaration of Zambia as a Christian nation.
This topic has required me to combine participant-observation in government
offices with interviews and interactions with church leaders, analysis of new
and traditional media, and textual studies like that which informs this article.
This mixed-methods research has in turn allowed me to take a much broader
approach to the question of Christian nationalism in Zambia, for example by
tracing the transnational theological influences that have shaped the move-
ment, a task to which I now turn.
1 Some Theological Roots of Contemporary Zambian Christian
Nationalism: Christian Reconstruction and the New Apostolic
Reformation
The firstWestern movement that concerns us is Christian Reconstruction. The
undisputed father of Christian Reconstruction was Rousas John Rushdoony,17
an Armenian-American conservative Calvinist born in 1916 and brought up
in Fresno County, California by Presbyterian parents. His father, a survivor
of the Armenian genocide, was a pastor, and the junior Rushdoony also dis-
cerned a call to ministry. His early years as a missionary on a Native American
15 McVicar, “Let Them Have Dominion,” 133.
16 See Naomi Haynes,Moving by the Spirit: Pentecostal Social Life on the Zambian Copperbelt
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017).
17 For an excellent intellectual history of Christian Reconstruction focused on Rushdoony,
see Michael J. McVicar, Christian Reconstruction: R.J. Rushdoony and American Religious
Conservatism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016).
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reservation in Nevada cemented a libertarian commitment that he combined
with his unique reading of Reformed theology to frame what he called “Chris-
tian Reconstruction.” Christian Reconstruction advocated for the restoration
of biblical—that is, primarily Old Testament—law, or “theonomy,” a cause that
led to someof Rushdoony’smost infamous positions, including advocacy of the
death penalty for homosexuals, witches, and recalcitrant youth.
HistorianMollyWorthen argues that the animating concern of Rushdoony’s
thought was cosmological differentiation.18 Rushdoony’s Chalcedon Founda-
tion was named for the Council of Chalcedon of 451ce, which ruled that Jesus
was at once fully divine and fully human.Rushdoonybuilt on this point to argue
for a hard, qualitative difference between God and humanity. In addition, as a
staunch Calvinist Rushdoony adhered to the doctrine of dual predestination,
arguing that even before their birth all humans are destined either for heaven
or hell. The world is therefore structured around fundamental hierarchical dis-
tinctions between the divine and the human and between the saved and the
damned. In view of this steeply graded spiritual topography, Rushdoony devel-
oped twoof his axiomatic principles: first, that there is no such thing as neutral-
ity (an idea he took from Calvinist theologian Cornelius van Til), and second,
that various “spheres” of human life (the family, the church, the government)
are each “sovereign” only over their particularly allocated jurisdiction. Both of
these ideas have been important to Zambian Christian political theology and
are worth unpacking here.
For Christian Reconstructionists, neutrality of the sort advocated by John
Rawls’s notion of “reasonable pluralism,” wherein public discourse must be
framed in terms of neutral, agreed-upon values,19 is a theological and cos-
mological impossibility. According to Rushdoony and his followers, the entire
world is under either divine or human control, and all political and social posi-
tions or institutions are therefore either advancingGod’s cause or advancing its
opposite, what Rushdoony identified as the cause of “humanism.” This meant
that there could never be a true separation of church and state any more than
there could be a secular state or public sphere.20 It was therefore up to a popu-
lation to decidewhether theywould adhere to the higher order of divinewill or
the lower order of human purposes and plans.21 It is in view of his disavowal of
18 Molly Worthen, “The Chalcedon Problem: Rousas John Rushdoony and the Origins of
Christian Reconstructionism,” Church History 77 (2008): 399–437.
19 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
20 Julie Ingersoll, Building God’s Kingdom: Inside theWorld of Christian Reconstruction (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 21.
21 Rousas JohnRushdoony,Christianity and the State (Vallecito, CA: RossHouse Books, 1986),
84.
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neutrality that Rushdoony came to his “fundamental claim” that “religious tol-
eration is un-Christian,”22 since tolerance ultimately amounted to ceding what
might otherwise be Christian territory to humanist influence.
Rushdoony’s commitment to the ontological distinction between God and
humans and between the saved and the damned also informed his concept of
“sphere sovereignty,” which Rushdoony borrowed from the nineteenth-century
Dutch theologian Abraham Kuyper. For Kuyper and for Rushdoony, sphere
sovereignty “meant that every realm of human society—church, academia, et
cetera—ought to be sovereign within its own sphere of influence, brooking
government intrusion only to resolve disputes or in the case of one sphere’s
failure tomeet its social responsibilities.”23 Importantly, these sphereswere not
all seen as equal in their influence. In his exposition on Saint Paul’s injunction
to pray for those in authority,24 Rushdoony points out that in offering these
prayers the Christian operates from a position of superiority to which earthly
rulers are ultimately beholden. As he puts it, in the biblical text “the king is
treated as a needy soul, and the praying Christian as a higher power who inter-
cedes with the Great King for him!”25
Rushdoony’s ideas have been influential in American conservative Protes-
tantism even though many contemporary Christians have never heard his
name. While his role in shaping the ideology of the Moral Majority is clear,26
he ultimately disapproved of their methods. As a libertarian, Rushdoony was
skeptical of Christian political activism, emphatic in his insistence that the gov-
ernment ought to have little or no control over the affairs of individuals and
families. His vision of social transformation turned on the aggregate effect of
personal or small-scale changes rather than on organized political interven-
tions. “After personal self-government is brought into line with God’s law, then
each family unit will adhere, and only then will broader social change begin,
culminating in the peaceful implementation of God’s law by churches, schools,
and a limited state, each in their respective spheres.”27 It is through this cumu-
lative process that Christian Reconstruction aimed to expand the influence
of Christianity—and by extension the “reign” of Jesus Christ—which is why
it gets lumped together with other so-called “dominionist” theologies. Much
of Christian Reconstructionism turns on a particular reading of Genesis 1:26–
22 Worthen, “The Chalcedon Problem,” 435.
23 Worthen, “TheChalcedonProblem,” 414; see also Ingersoll, BuildingGod’sKingdom, 50–52.
24 1Timothy 2: 1–2.
25 Rushdoony, Christianity and the State, 145.
26 McVicar, Christian Reconstruction, 145.
27 Worthen, “The Chalcedon Problem,” 425.
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28, God’s command to Adam and Eve to “fill the earth and subdue it.” In view
of this mandate, Rushdoony argued that “Christians can become ‘dominion
men,’ who ‘take dominion’ over the planet and ‘reconstruct’ all of life according
to Old Testament law.”28 A similar aim animates the New Apostolic Reforma-
tion, amovement that has also contributed considerably topolitical theological
thought in Zambia.
The New Apostolic Reformation (nar) is a diffuse Christian movement
made up of large collections of churches aligned under particular apostolic fig-
ures.29 The late C. PeterWagner, former professor at the Fuller Seminary School
of World Mission in Pasadena, California, is usually regarded as the intellec-
tual architect of nar; he coined the term “New Apostolic Reformation” in a
book that makes use of the term in the title30 and was instrumental in artic-
ulating the aims and scope of the movement. Wagner’s choice of the word
“Reformation” is instructive, as he believed that nar represented a paradigm
shift in ecclesiastical practice and governance on a par with the Protestant
Reformation. Despite his influence, Wagner insisted that neither he nor any-
one else was at the “helm” of nar, an intentionally acephalous and disparate
movement characterized by personal connections, semiformal agreements,
and dense relational networks.31
The lack of a centralized authority structure in nar belies the movement’s
hallmark commitment to “apostolic” leadership. nar is often described as a
restoration of the “five-fold” ministry described in Ephesians 4:11, which iden-
tifies five offices of church leadership: apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors,
and teachers. Each one of these offices represents “an authorization to engage
in an arena of activity that is an empowerment as well,” a “particular endow-
ment” that inheres uniquely in those called to be apostles, pastors, and so
forth.32 Wagner argued that the offices represented by the fivefold ministry
were hierarchically arranged in a “divine order” that put apostles first, with
prophets following closely behind in an apostolic-prophetic alliance with the
power to shape and reprimand local church leaders (i.e. pastors and teach-
28 McVicar, “Let them have Dominion,” 122.
29 Peter Althouse and RobbyWaddell, eds, “The New Charismatic Networks and Other The-
ological Matters,”Pneuma 38, nos. 1/2 (2016): 1–4.
30 C. Peter Wagner. Churchquake! How the New Apostolic Reformation Is Shaking Up the
Church asWe Know It (Ventura, CA: Regal, 1999).
31 Michael Wilkinson, “Charismatic Christianity and the Role of Social Networks,” Pneuma
38, nos. 1/2 (2016): 33.
32 Jon Bialecki, “Apostolic Networks in the Third Wave of the Spirit,” Pneuma 38, nos. 1/2
(2016): 30.
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ers).33 This emphasis on a divinely ranked set of church offices, which carries
echoes of Christian Reconstructionism’smodel of sphere sovereignty, gives the
nar a strong division of labor. It also informs the arrangements among individ-
ual congregations andministries associated with nar, which often include the
religious equivalent of noncompetition agreements, with leaders committing
not to impinge on one another’s spiritual territory.34 As Wagner described it,
“Apostles are not in competition with each other, they are in cahoots.”35
One of the central aims of nar’s vision of church governance and practice
is cultural change and, more specifically, creating “a society in which evangeli-
cal Christian values predominate.”36 This change relies more on the quality of
Christian influence thanof its quantity.To summarize anargumentput forward
byOsHillman, in the nar’smodel of social transformation thework of cultural
change has historically been carried out by a very small number of people—
“nomore than three thousand change agents” across all of humanhistory. “That
is why,” he goes on,
we must realize that making more converts will not necessarily change
culture. It is important to have conversions, but it is more important to
have those who are converted operate at the tops of the cultural moun-
tains from a biblical worldview … It doesn’t matter if the majority of the
culture is made up of Christians. It only matters who has the greatest
influence over that cultural mountain.37
Hillman’s reference to “cultural mountains” is a nod to one of nar’s key heuris-
tics, the “Seven Mountains of Influence”: Arts and Entertainment, Business,
Education, Family, Government, Media, and Religion.38 According to several
writers,39 the notion that influence was organized according to these seven
mountains was simultaneously revealed to two prominent U.S. evangelical
33 C. PeterWagner, “The New Apostolic Reformation Is Not a Cult,” Charisma (2011).
34 Wilkinson, “Charismatic Christianity.”
35 Wagner, “The New Apostolic Reformation.”
36 John Weaver, The New Apostolic Reformation: History of a Modern Charismatic Movement
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2016), 146.
37 Os Hillman, “How Christians Can Change Our Culture,” The Christian Post, May 24, 2013,
https://www.christianpost.com/news/how‑christians‑can‑change‑our‑culture.html;
accessed May 3, 2021.
38 Also sometimes reconfigured to include military by combining arts and entertainment.
39 For example,Generals International, “The SevenMountains of Cultural Influence,” https://​
www.generals.org/rpn/the‑seven‑mountains/; last accessed February 20, 2020, no longer
available.
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leaders40 in 1975. The idea of the Seven Mountains has since spread widely in
Christian circles and found a particular platform in nar. Central to the nar
vision is the need to place Christians in “divinely strategic” positions on each of
these “mountains” as a means of changing culture to reflect the Christian val-
ues.41When Christians take up their position on, for example, theMountain of
Arts and Entertainment, “secular artists will begin to take their cues from the
kingdom of God as it manifests through His children. They will add their lyrics
to our music, rather than the other way around, as it has been for much too
long.”42
The model of social change employed by nar is in some respects differ-
ent from that of Christian Reconstruction. Rushdoony, in particular, would
not have countenanced Christian efforts to effect significant influence through
government or education. More broadly, as we have seen, in the framework
of Christian Reconstruction social transformation is episodic, brought about
through the combined efforts of individual families and congregations. In con-
trast, the SevenMountains model of the nar emphasizes the roles of both key
institutions and elite actors, putting more stock in the top-down efforts of a
select few to trickle down into societymore generally.Despite thesedifferences,
however, both movements have made it their mission to effect cultural and
social transformation beyond the four walls of the church, which is why both
nar and Christian Reconstruction figure in discussions of so-called “domin-
ionist” theology. The tension between thesemodels of cultural change has also
informed Christian social engagement in Zambia,43 although, as we will see,
this is not the only way in which ideas taken from Christian Reconstruction
and nar have shaped the thought of those guiding Zambia’s Christian nation-
alist project.
2 Making Zambia a Christian Nation
Turning our attention to Zambia, I want to look at two short books written by
and for key players in the country’s ongoing Christian nationalist project. Each
40 Bill Bright, founder of Campus Crusade for Christ (later rebranded as “Cru”) and Loren
Cunningham, founder of Youth with a Mission.
41 Johnny Enlow,The SevenMountain Prophecy: Unveiling the Coming Elijah Revolution (Lake
Mary, FL: Creation House, 2008), 10.
42 Enlow, The SevenMountain Prophecy, 150.
43 Also Naomi Haynes, “Concretizing the Christian Nation: Negotiating Zambia’s National
House of Prayer,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 41 (2021):
166–174.
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of them cites the influences of Christian Reconstruction or nar—specifically
the work of Rushdoony on the one hand and the Seven Mountains model on
the other—in developing their arguments about what it means for Zambia to
be a Christian nation. The first book was written by Dr. Catherine Mukuka, a
distinguished medical doctor and Pentecostal with an abiding interest in law
(her sister is a judge). I first heard of her book in 2018 during a presentation by
Zambia’s then-Secretary to the Cabinet, Dr. Roland Msiska. Speaking to hun-
dreds of assembled church leaders at Lusaka’s Anglican Cathedral of the Holy
Cross, Dr. Msiska encouraged everyone to read Dr. Mukuka’s book. Inspired by
this recommendation I tracked it down at a local mall;44 several months later I
was able to locateDr.Mukuka aswell, and she agreed tomeetme so I could talk
to her about her book. Dr. Mukuka and Imet in November 2018 at an upmarket
coffee shop in Lusaka. We sat in fake leather armchairs sipping bottled water
out of wine glasses; all around us the usual crowd of expatriates took up most
of the other tables, eachwith a laptop and iced coffee in reach. Dr.Mukukawas
fashionably dressed in the casual attire of a semiretired professional woman—
a loose blazer and trouserswith trendymetallic sandals.Her close-croppedhair
was graying at the temples, and purple-rimmed glasses balanced on her nose.
Dr. Mukuka explained to me that she had written and self-published her
book, A Christian Nation versus a Secular State: The Making of a Constitution,45
after firstmaking a thirteen-page submission to the 2005Constitutional Review
Commission (crc) in support of the declaration. While the crc had received
far more submissions in support of the declaration, they had also heard from
a substantial number of parties who opposed its inclusion in the revised con-
stitution, and had in an interim report stated that they would stand with the
minority on this issue. In addition to the possibility that the declaration might
be removed from the preamble of the constitution (which ultimately did not
happen), Dr.Mukukawas also concerned that the document seemed to contra-
dict itself, since several articles in the body of the document described Zambia
as a secular state. These two issues—the possible removal of the declaration
and its contradiction in subsequent articles of the constitution—provide the
background forMukuka’s book. During our interview I askedDr.Mukuka about
the influences that shaped her argument, particularly Rushdoony, whom she
44 Despite this high-profile recommendation, I have no way of knowing howwidely read Dr.
Mukuka’s book has been. It is reasonably easy to find in Lusaka, which boasts several large
book stores that carry local titles alongside international bestsellers. However, books are
expensive, and therefore largely inaccessible.
45 CatherineMukuka, AChristianNationVersus a Secular State: TheMaking of a Constitution
(Lusaka: Abiyah Publishing House, 2006).
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quotes at length throughout the text. She explained thatwhilewriting the book
she had basically no internet access, and therefore had to rely on whatever
books she had available, which were also limited. She stumbled upon most of
her sources when visiting her sister on the Copperbelt, where she met a young
man who was selling Christian books. While she didn’t describe his trade in
detail, I pictured his business like that of the informal booksellers I knew dur-
ing my previous fieldwork on the Copperbelt—a hodgepodge of wares from
textbooks to paperback novels, each marked with a handwritten price tag and
spread on the sidewalk in the shade of a downtown office building. From
this trader she bought several volumes that became the core references for
her book, including Rushdoony’s Philosophy of the Christian Curriculum, Chris-
tianity and the State, Law and Liberty, and Institutes of Biblical Law, as well as
a Catholic encyclopedia. Reading these books didn’t so much transform her
thought as translate it, Dr.Mukuka explained, and she felt that the authors gave
her a language to talk about what she already believed. However, as we will
see, there are points where her argument diverges from the Reconstructionist
sources that inform her writing.
Dr. Mukuka’s argument hinges on what she identifies as a homology among
secularism, humanism, and Satanism. Mukuka gets her definition of secular-
ism from an array of sources, including the Catholic encyclopedia and publi-
cations by humanist organizations in the UK and the US. Drawing directly on
Rushdoony, she goes on to argue that secularism is at bottom “a religion” with
“its own concept of what is evil and forbidden and also what is permitted.”46
From this point, however, her thought begins to depart fromRushdoony’s rejec-
tion of neutrality in a direction shapedmore byAfrican Pentecostalism than by
American Christian Reconstructionism.While Pentecostals also maintain that
there is no neutral territory in the cosmos, they differ from Reconstructionists
in their understanding of how this territory is divided. To wit, whereas Rush-
doony saw the world as under the control either of God or of sinful humanity,
the central dualism of pentecostal cosmology divides the universe into the ter-
ritory of God and the territory of Satan.47 For Pentecostals like Dr. Mukuka,
anything that is not expressly Christian is effectively satanic—for example, I
have heard Zambian Pentecostals describe Hindus as “Satanists.” In view of
this established dualism,Mukuka argues that since the tenets of secularism are
46 Mukuka, A Christian Nation, 23.
47 Jörg Haustein, “Embodying the Spirit(s): Pentecostal Demonology and Deliverance Dis-
course in Ethiopia,” Ethnos 76 (2011): 534–552; Adriaan S. van Klinken, “Gay Rights, the
Devil and the End Times: Public Religion and the Enchantment of the Homosexuality
Debate in Zambia,”Religion 43 (2013): 526–528.
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not biblical, “it can only be concluded that [secularism] is a religion of Satan.
Clearly the god of secular humanism is Satan. This is why its statements of
belief are anti-Christian and anti-the Bible.”48
Mukuka makes a similar point in her discussion of humanism, a term that
has a specific historical connotation in Zambia. The country’s first president,
Kenneth Kaunda, developed an ideology over the course of his nearly thirty
years in power that he called “humanism.”49 A mixture of socialism and the
African concept of “ubuntu,” Kaunda’s brand of humanism was promoted as
Zambia’s national philosophy, taught in schools, and used as a guide for gov-
ernment initiatives. In contrast to some other Zambian Christian writers,50
Mukuka (whose personal copy of Kaunda’s short book on humanism was
autographed, thanks to the efforts of an aunt who worked in the president’s
office) makes no distinction between Kaunda’s humanism and that of West-
ern secular humanist activists, which allows her to draw an easy parallel first
betweenhumanismand secularismand, by extension, betweenhumanismand
the devil. Mukuka is not the only Pentecostal of her generation to make such
strong accusations against Zambia’s first president. In the 1980s, Kaunda’s close
relationship with the guru Dr. M.A. Ranganathan concerned many Christians,
who argued in the Zambian press that the president had effectively forged an
alliance with the devil by exploring Eastern religion.51 In Dr. Mukuka’s telling,
when Kaunda made humanism the national philosophy of Zambia, he made
a spiritual, covenantal move that would be undone only by the declaration of
Zambia as a Christian nation.52 Before that, “Zambia was … under the god of
humanism who we know to be Satan.”53
By describing the declaration as a covenant that undid a previous pact with
the devil, Dr. Mukuka is appealing to what we have already identified as an
established pentecostal understanding of the declaration as a divine agree-
ment betweenGod and the nation.This framingwas explicitly used byChiluba,
48 Mukuka, A Christian Nation, 23.
49 Kenneth David Kaunda, Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to Its Implementation (Lusaka
Division of National Guidance, 1974).
50 See, for example, Derrick Muwina Muwina, Kenneth Kaunda’s Philosophy of Christian
Humanism in Africa from the Perspective of Christian Ethics (PhD diss., School of Theol-
ogy, Boston University, 2018).
51 See Gifford, “Chiluba’s Christian Nation,” 364.
52 More recently, a similar point has been made by pentecostal writer Chisala Kateka, who
observes that under Kaunda Zambia followed “the philosophy of humanism (an anti-
biblical philosophy).” See Chisala Kateka, Let Us pray for Zambia and Let His Kingdom
Come (Lusaka: self-published, n.d.), 34.
53 Mukuka, A Christian Nation, 38.
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who first announced the declaration as a “covenant with the living God.” In
the same television broadcast, Chiluba also repented “on behalf of the nation”
for the country’s “idolatry, witchcraft, the occult [sic], immorality, injustice,
and corruption,”54 thereby breaking any previous spiritual agreements made
by President Kaunda. In the light of this framing, subsequent discussions of
political change among Zambian pentecostal laypeople, and particularly the
prospect of a new president, have often been articulated in covenantal terms.55
This suggests that the theological structure of the declaration established by
Chiluba extends both backward and forward in time, recasting the Kaunda
era as one of a diabolical covenant and imagining any future government as
either reaffirming or removing the divine covenant established by the decla-
ration.56 In her critique of Kaunda’s humanism, then, Dr. Mukuka draws on
a locally specific articulation of Pentecostalism’s well documented dualism,
and in so doing reconfigures a central heuristic of North American Christian
Reconstruction—the bifurcation of the cosmos into territories under divine or
human control—in Zambian terms.
The second book, Embracing our Destiny: Redeeming Zambia in Righteous-
ness—Africa’s Tithe,57 is authored by a group of people comprising the Zambia
branch of the international “Africa Arise” movement, founded by a pentecostal
pastor in Ethiopia. One of the main authors of the book is Dr. Sibeso Luswata,
a curriculum specialist and erstwhile unicef consultant on education. Dr.
Luswata is a member of Northmead Assemblies of God, a prominent church
in Lusaka with an internationally known choir and a weekly television broad-
cast carried by the Zambian National Broadcasting Company.58 Northmead
is headed by Dr. Bishop Joshua Banda, a senior pentecostal leader and, more
recently, a close confidant of Zambian President Edgar Lungu. Bishop Banda
penned the foreword to Embracing our Destiny, which provides the theological
orientation for the rest of the book. Using the Seven Mountains model as his
guide, Banda evaluates Zambia’s progresswith regard toChristian influence; he
54 Quoted in Gifford, “Chiluba’s Christian Nation,” 367.
55 See Haynes, “ ‘Zambia Shall be Saved!’ ” for a detailed analysis of these discussions.
56 This covenantal view of Kaunda’s government is alsowhy it was so important that Kaunda
publicly “released” the country “from every negative forces [sic] made against Zambia” in
a widely publicized statement from 2015. See: https://www.lusakatimes.com/2015/05/26/​
kk‑prays‑and‑blesses‑the‑nation/. Accessed January 27, 2021.
57 Africa Arise, Embracing Our Destiny: Redeeming Zambia in Righteousness—Africa’s Tithe
(Nairobi: Asaph Office Publications, 2016).
58 See Adriaan van Klinken, Transforming Masculinities in African Christianity: Gender Con-
troversies in Times of aids (New York: Routledge, 2016), 103–148, for more information on
Northmead Assembly.
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is sanguine about the state of education and arts and entertainment, more cir-
cumspect about Christianity’s role in shapingmedia and, perhaps surprisingly,
religion, citing the expansion of “radical Islam” across Africa as a particular
point of concern.
The rest of the book is also informed by nar principles. Just as advocates
of the Seven Mountains framework argue that transformation will be effected
by individual Christians who step into their calling, the Africa Arise authors
believe that God’s calling for Zambia will help bring transformation to other
nations.Their arguments in this regard echobroader trends in “neo-Pentecostal
internationalism” which “charges certain nations with uniquely Christian re-
sponsibilities” in relationship to the rest of the world.59 Specifically, the Africa
Arise authors argue that God has set aside their country as a “tithe” for the rest
of the continent. They never spell out precisely what they mean by this con-
cept, apart from thenotion thatwhat Zambia has to offer Africawill necessarily
follow from what God has given the country, just as a tithe is a proportional
gift, the amount of which is determined by one’s income.60 By way of Zam-
bia’s endowments, the authors first cite the country’s relatively unique history
of interethnic peace, its well its established Christian tradition beginning with
David Livingstone, and the welcome reception that those fleeing violence have
always received in Zambia. They also draw particular attention to the country’s
natural resources, especially those that are underutilized (such as arable land
and fresh water) or undiscovered (many Zambian Pentecostals believe, follow-
ing well publicized prophetic words, that the country has untapped mineral
andpetroleum reserves that are farmore extensive thanwhat is currently being
extracted). In view of its history and resources, the authors argue, drawing on
the words of Charles Kachikoti, “Zambia has become a prized jewel among
the great nations of the earth.”61 Key to Zambia’s ultimate success or failure
to fulfill this destiny is the progress of Christians up the “business” mountain of
influence, which the authors place on par with divinely ordained offices such
as apostles and prophets.62 This emphasis on the economic sphere continues
throughout the final chapter of the book, which focuses on strategies to help
59 KevinLewisO’Neill,City of God:ChristianCitizenship inPostwarGuatemala (Berkeley:Uni-
versity of California Press, 2010), 172.
60 During an interview in 2017, I asked Dr. Luswata what it meant for Zambia to be Africa’s
“tithe,” and at that point she emphasized that Zambia should be a leader, since it was the
first (and as yet the only) African country to declare itself a Christian nation; the connec-
tion to tithing here may be in the idea of giving one’s “first fruits” to God.
61 Africa Arise, Embracing our Destiny, 45.
62 Africa Arise, Embracing our Destiny, 92.
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Zambia take its rightful place as Africa’s tithe, and specifically on the willing-
ness of Christian business people to “claim the economy” for Christ.63
While the authors examined here have clearly drawn on the ideas of Chris-
tian Reconstruction and nar in developing their visions of what it means for
Zambia to be a Christian nation, it is equally apparent that they have modified
these ideas to reflect local perspectives and concerns. By way of a conclusion, I
would like to examine further two key points of distinction between theWest-
ern theologicalmodels the authors employ and the particular argumentsmade
by the latter in order to make a few brief observations about the varieties and
forms of Christian nationalism operating in Zambia.
3 Conclusion: North American Political Theology in a Zambian Key
The first point to discuss is the shift from Christian Reconstructionism’s dual-
istic division between God and humanity to an African pentecostal division
between God and Satan, which clearly influenced Dr. Mukuka’s understanding
of how humanism shaped Zambia’s destiny. Mukuka’s pentecostal view builds
on Rushdoony’s argument that there is no such thing as neutrality, and ulti-
mately raises the stakes of this claim by assigning control of non-Christian ter-
ritory not to fallen humanity but to the evil workings of Satan. The comparison
here is one between two different covenants, the divine covenant of the dec-
laration, which promises peace and prosperity, and the predatory covenants
of satanic pacts, which literally demand the lives of those caught in the mid-
dle of them.64 In this framing, there is not only no neutral territory, there is
no safe place outside the declaration. This perspective, by extension, rejects
the supposed neutrality of the secular liberalism that often undergirds argu-
ments about the separation of church and state. Writing about postapartheid
SouthAfrica, Johnand JeanComaroff note the seductive promise of liberal con-
stitutions to “transmute difference into singularity” through appeals to global
standards of human rights.65 Building on this observation, they argue that the
unifying potential of liberalism, particularly insofar as it seeks to incorporate
a broad range of cultural differences, is not so easily realized as its proponents
imagined.WhereComaroff andComaroff focus on culture, exemplified in their
63 Africa Arise, Embracing our Destiny, 102.
64 See Haynes, “ ‘Zambia Shall be Saved!’ ”
65 John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, “Criminal Justice, Cultural Justice: The Limits of Lib-
eralism and the Pragmatics Of Difference in the New South Africa,”American Ethnologist
31 (2004): 192.
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argument in beliefs about witchcraft, parallel discussions of what they call the
“limits of liberalism” have likewise emphasized the inability of rights-based
legal structures to accommodate religious diversity.66 This is clear in the exam-
ple of Christian Concern, a UK charity dedicated to defending the rights of
Christians facing legal discrimination in an increasingly secular Britain. Cases
taken by Christian Concern’s legal team often highlight the legal stalemate of
liberalism, which pits some rights (for example, those of religious conscience)
against others (such as sexual expression).67 Taken together, these examples
suggest conclusions that Rushdoony himself anticipated: that neutrality, in this
case legal neutrality, is really nothing of the sort, and that outside of the frame-
work of divine rule one was left to the judgments of humans—judgments that
Christians and non-Christians alike often find unsatisfying.What the Zambian
case further demonstrates, then, is the need for political, institutional, and legal
categories beyond those found in theWestern liberal tradition or, for that mat-
ter, in the framework of Christian Reconstruction.
Turning our attention to the Africa Arise volume, it is clear that for Zambian
church leaders such as Bishop Banda, the social changes associated with their
country’s divine destiny hinge on economic transformation. While the book
pays attention to all SevenMountains of Influence, themountain that thewrit-
ers regard as themost crucial to conquer is neither the governmentnor religion,
but rather business and the economy (recall that they put economic leaders
on par with apostles and prophets). This view suggests that for church lead-
ers (and in my experience this holds for laypeople as well), Zambia’s spiritual
development is inextricably linked to the country’s economic progress. Given
the widespread influence of the prosperity gospel on Zambian Christianity
over the last twenty years,68 this is not surprising.When we read this emphasis
back onto the theological models that Zambian Christians are using, we see a
very different critical framework from that which we typically associate with
Christian nationalism in the West. To wit, while political critiques that focus
on economic problems are not uncommon in Christian circles, they are often
absent from the conservativism that animates most Christian nationalism, at
66 See, for example, Saba Mahmood, Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); Méadhbh McIvor, “Human Rights and Bro-
ken Cisterns: Counterpublic Christianity and Rights-based Discourse in Contemporary
England,”Ethnos 84 (2019): 323–343.
67 SeeMcIvor, “Human Rights and Broken Cisterns”; MéadhbhMcIvor, “Rights and Relation-
ships: Rhetorics of Religious Freedom among English Evangelicals,” Journal of the Ameri-
can Academy of Religion 87 (2019): 860–888.
68 Haynes,Moving by the Spirit.
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least in the United States. In contrast, Zambian Christian nationalists see very
clearly that the key to social change in their country is economic change.
This observation returns us to the vexed question of lgbt rights with which
our discussion began, and more specifically to accusations of undue Western
influence in shaping anti-gay legislation inAfrica. A recent exposé on the South
African website The Daily Maverick singled out Zambia’s ambassador to the
African Union, Emmanuel Mwamba, for his public opposition to “comprehen-
sive sexuality education” (cse).69 Mwamba has been publicly skeptical of cse
in part because of its acceptance of homosexuality, a position that his crit-
ics connect to Mwamba’s relationship with Family Watch International, an
American Christian ngo. While it is not difficult to believe that the ambas-
sador’s opinions have been influenced by his connection to Western conser-
vative Christianity, in view of the foregoing discussion we might ask whether
there is more to the story than the simple one-way influence of powerful inter-
national donors. In an Op-Ed making his case against the rollout of cse in
Zambia, Mwamba calls for the money that would be spent on this initiative
to be used instead to support what he calls “comprehensive entrepreneurship
education” for young people.70 Mwamba’s article is not just a call to shift the
financial priorities of overseas charities, or even a criticism of Western liberal
sexual ethics. By echoing Zambian church leaders’ reorientation of the Seven
Mountains model around economic empowerment, Mwamba’s piece can also
be read as a call for national, divinely mandated movement toward Zambia’s
national destiny as “Africa’s tithe.” Insofar as this is the case, his critique of cse
is shaped by local theological adaptations, even as it is also clearly influenced
by the concerns of conservative American Christians.71 At play in Mwamba’s
rejection of cse, then, are several lines of critical interrogation, now accept-
ing, now pushing back, nowmodifying the ideas and concerns of transnational
69 Kerry Cullinan, Zarina Geloo, and Tuyeimo Haidula, “American Christian Right Group
Hosts Anti-lgbt Training for African Politicians,” The Daily Maverick, October 27, 2020.
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020‑10‑27‑american‑christian‑right‑group‑hos
ts‑anti‑lgbt‑training‑for‑african‑politicians/?fbclid=IwAR2PmJkdeCLMMCLAhFBKRDU
x‑B6knR5IPCUiS6cKZGRCyuDgJWPNUngWOTw, accessed January 27, 2021.
70 Emmanuel Mwamba, “Op-Ed: Entrepreneurship or Sex Education, Where Should Our
Focus Be?” The Independent Observer, September 22, 2020, https://tiozambia.com/op‑ed​
‑entrepreneurship‑or‑sex‑education‑where‑should‑our‑focus‑be/?fbclid=IwAR0Li9XQF
Fr849Lk27vbR_q05vjC0ZW00Hms_peQEfaoVRDaX37GJzX_up0, accessed January 27,
2021.
71 This complex blend of critique and adaptation is also evidenced in the parallel Mwamba
draws between cse and structural adjustment, an externally imposed initiative that had
drastic consequences for the economies of Zambia and many other African countries.
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Christian actors. These moves are subtle and therefore easy to miss, but they
are important to anyone wishing to understand the public face of contempo-
rary African Christianity.
Clearly, theological ideas withWestern roots have had an important part to
play in shaping the contours of Christian nationalism in contemporary Zam-
bia. What the foregoing analysis has also demonstrated, however, is that even
subtle shifts in content or emphasis have significant implications for the way
in which church and state leaders approach religious politics in Africa’s only
self-declaredChristian nation. Future research onChristian politics around the
world, but perhaps especially in postcolonial contexts, will therefore require
a careful balance of rigorous textual engagement with primary sources that
may have traveled to the context under study through transnational networks,
with careful ethnographic and literary study to demonstrate how these sources
are taken up. Such efforts represent important contributions to “fine-grained
ethnographic discussions that can flesh out the contours of … the Christian
nationalist problem,”72 to return to Bialecki’s words. It is only through analysis
of this kind that we are able to avoid reductive arguments about the outsized
influence of theWest. In other words, it is only through a careful, ethnographi-
cally grounded reading of Christian nationalist movements that we are able to
effectively map the theological influences shaping Christian politics, as well as
the unique ways in which local Christian communities are working with these
theological ideas to respond to their particular concerns.
72 Bialecki, “Eschatology, Ethics, and Ēthnos,” 46.
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